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Abstract: 
The economic transition characterizing the process of European industrialization in the 19th century 
was concentrated on regions rather than on states. In the first half of the 19th century, the region of 
Aachen (in the west of Prussia) pioneered on the territory of the German states and developed to a 
powerful industrial region. The implementation and diffusion of the factory system and the economic 
impact of adapted and new institutions make the core of this paper. Reciprocal interconnections be-
tween firms of different clusters shaped the region and created economic dynamics. Investments trans-
gressed the boundaries of single industries and new industries emerged. One important feature of the 
regional production system was cross-sectional knowledge transfer; a second was institutions support-
ive to this process. 
1. Introduction* 
European early industrialisation was concentrated in regions rather than states.1 In the case of 
the German states, the region of Aachen (Prussian Rhine province) was pioneering as meas-
ured by the diffusion of the factory system, by employment and industrial production. In the 
first decades of the 19
th
 century, traditional branches that had dominated the export industries 
based on artisanry and the putting-out system in the early modern period, particularly woollen 
cloth, introduced modern factory production with power engines and sophisticated machinery. 
Coal mining developed to industrial scale, and industrialisation of iron and steel led to spatial 
concentration of production. New industries emerged within the region reflecting changes in 
industrial demand and new raw materials. Supportive institutional arrangements advanced 
rapid transition to industrial capitalism. By 1860, two thirds of the regional workforce was 
employed by industry. This article takes a regional and industry based approach in order to 
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analyse economic development in the region of Aachen and in order to explain how and why 
different clustered industries created interconnections allowing for cross-sector learning, 
knowledge sharing, and technical and entrepreneurial spill-over. The framing ideas of the 
analysis are borrowed from traditional and modern literature on industrial districts (ID)2 and 
on clusters.3  
The two concepts share similarities, but they have distinct perspectives.4 The (neo-) Mar-
shallian ID is defined as a local concentration of a large number of small and medium sized 
firms within a dominant industry (usually light manufacturing) involving both horizontally 
competing and related vertically specialised firms as well as companies providing specialised 
services. The ID constitutes an economic system functioning as a viable alternative to vertical 
integration and large scale production (even in mass production industries). To a certain ex-
tent, other industries ‘may be localised in the district […] for example the nuclei of new in-
dustries, or the remains of old industries’.5 Due to its “industrial atmosphere” (Marshall), the 
people in an ID share belief systems and develop social institutions that support collective 
interests, they form a “socio-territorial entity” (Becattini), in which ‘community and firms 
tend to merge’.6 IDs allow for (vertical) division of labour between firms, for learning and 
knowledge sharing despite of competition; they create economic advantages external to the 
firm, yet internal to the district (“Marshall-Arrow-Romer externalities”, produced and con-
sumed in a given sector): economies of scale, cost reduction and increased returns.7 
Whereas the ID literature stresses local concentrations of small manufacturing firms, a 
cluster may encompass different configurations, including coexistence of few very large com-
panies with many small and medium sized companies. According to Porter cluster is defined 
as a ‘geographically proximate group of interconnected companies, service providers and as-
sociated institutions in a particular field, linked by externalities of various types.’ Like an ID 
it is supposed to create advantages external to the firm, for example because firms in related 
industries (specialized suppliers of components and services) offer advantages to the firms of 
the cluster. In combination with strong competition among the companies central to the clus-
tered industry leading to higher levels of specialization, this increases overall competitiveness 
and innovation capacities. Porter emphasized that ‘the industry may not be the appropriate 
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unit of analysis […] specialization in clusters of related industries, not in industries per se, 
should lead to better regional performance.’ He then introduces related and “overlapping clus-
ters” that should be associated with higher performance than unrelated clusters.8 
Both concepts share the spatial approach and provide contextualized interpretations of 
economically successful environments not explained by mainstream microeconomics. They 
are similar but want to explain partly different phenomena. In Porter’s perspective ‘IDs are 
one type of a cluster’ achieving ‘their advantages primarily through local outsourcing on the 
local level’9 and social embeddedness. Cluster research draws more on industrial economics, 
company strategy, and formal institutions. In a historical perspective, however, some of these 
differences disappear. First, industrial regions encompassing different industries very often 
emerged from (proto-) industrial districts.10 And second, formal institutions supportive to 
modern clusters (like trade associations, standard setting agencies, quality centres, technology 
networks) did not yet exist in the late 18
th
 and early 19
th
 century or they disappeared when the 
guild system was dissolved. At the time, social embedded economic activity was probably 
more important than slowly developing new formal institutions. A third approach focusing on 
spatial dimensions of economic development, “regional industrialisation”, is less specific than 
the concepts of IDs and clusters. It mainly focuses on input-output analysis and forward and 
backward linkages of industries11 (corresponding to “related industries” in the cluster and 
“specialised suppliers” in the ID concept. The differences of the approaches mainly result 
from the units of analysis: In the case of ID it is an industry and its organisation; the cluster 
approach analysis related firms within their network and surrounding institutions; the concern 
of regional industrialisation is the respective region that may be host to clusters or may in-
clude an ID. This paper aims at analysing regional economic development just like “regional 
industrialisation”, but it uses analytical ideas from the concepts of IDs and clusters for analys-
ing and explaining regional economic dynamics. 
If narrowly defined, both concepts (IDs and clusters) overlook important factors for histor-
ically observable economic development, what has been stressed for English early industriali-
sation, too.12 In the early modern period the region of Aachen might well be described as en-
compassing a pre-industrial woollen cloth districts and a pre-industrial needle district (with 
brass as an additional, less important sectors). In the 19
th
 century, the industrial region of Aa-
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chen does no longer fit to the ID concept. About 1850 the major industries of the region, ‘old’ 
ones like woollen cloth, coal mining, paper, and needles and also ‘new’ industries such as iron 
and steel, machinery, railway wagons, zinc produced on large scale with modern factory 
equipment. In contrast to the (neo-) Marshallian ID, these firms were yet not ‘small’; approx-
imately 2/3 of the districts’ total workforce was working in manufacturing and mining; half of 
them in factories with more than 100 workers.13 Most important have been woollen cloth, coal 
mining, and iron and steel, each of them showing strong tendencies of vertical integration. 
Yet, reciprocal interconnections between different industries constituted an important feature 
of the regional economy. It was thus characterized by both ‘Marshall-Arrow-Romer externali-
ties’ and ‘Jacobs externalities’ (defined as flows between firms in all sectors).14 The cluster 
concept would not be a sufficient substitute for the ID concept, as it would tend to neglect 
important socio-economic factors such as locality and social embeddedness. It would also 
assume positive effects of related industries, but not flows across all sectors. 
Map 1:  Prussia, administrative districts. District of Aachen (dark). 
 
Source: © IEG Mainz, A. Kunz (2001), own adaption. 
The development in Aachen is interesting because reciprocal interactions of unrelated indus-
tries have been important for regional economic development (woollen cloth, for example, is 
unrelated to needle making or heavy industry). The different clusters were embedded in a so-
cial structure that corresponds to an ID, and they were partly overlapping especially in regard 
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to developing new industries. Identifying these dynamics of “overlapping clusters” is the pur-
pose of this article.  
The transition from commercial to industrial capitalism had been influenced by supportive 
institutional arrangements partly based on French law:15 In 1798, after the Revolutionary Wars 
the Rhineland became French and the district of Aachen became the Département de la Roer. 
After the French defeat in 1814, the region was integrated into Prussia, yet with few excep-
tions the French legal system continued. The code civil and the code de commerce rather than 
Prussian civil law16 constituted the norms of commercial activities. Also other institutions of 
French origin, like chambers of commerce, commercial courts, or arbitration boards for work 
related conflicts, helped shaping economic behaviour. New Prussian laws in general did not 
dramatically influence regional economic development.17 However important French institu-
tions have been for regional economic development, it must be noted that the transition to-
wards a “modern” economy had started long before. Already during the 18th century, the 
guilds lost capacity to enforce their norms and rules. Capitalist firms emerged and for already 
about two hundred years farming had not been subject to a feudal regime, instead landowner-
ship and inheritable leasing dominated. The French Revolution made this process irreversible 
and fully implemented private property and bourgeois law.18 
In the analytical framework of this study the region is an economic entity rather than a po-
litical territory. It has been constructed in terms of economic activity (level of industrial and 
factory employment).19 Yet, also territory (the border between Prussia and the Low Countries, 
and later Belgium) defines the region because trade restrictions negatively impacted cross-
border exchange of raw materials, prefabricated goods, and labour when the Rhine province 
became Prussian in 1814. The border had a paradox function20 in that it connected inde-
pendently developing regions for instance by attracting Belgian investments to Aachen. 
German economic historical research on the 19
th
 century has mainly focused on the emer-
gent nation state and the second industrial revolution and less on the formative period of in-
dustrial capitalism, the early 19
th
 century. The period is covered in edited volumes presenting 
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the regional approach,21 yet substantial new research has been published only on a few regions 
like the Saar22 and Saxonia23 or it is limited to a local level.24 The industrial region of Aachen, 
despite of considerable research on proto-industrialisation in the region25 (though not covering 
the transition to industrial capitalism), has not been studied accordingly.26 This article is part 
of a project on a comprehensive regional economic history of Aachen; the material used 
comes from public archives, contemporary publications, and also from early 20
th
 century pub-
lications that was based on archival sources destroyed in the two world wars. 
Map 2:  Administrative district (Regierungsbezirk) of Aachen. Industrial region (dark)  
and coal mining areas (approximately). 
 
Source: Own construction. 
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The scope of this paper does not allow for an analysis of all industrial branches; it focuses on 
the largest industries (woollen cloth, coal mining, and iron and steel) and on the interconnec-
tions between them; other industries involved in the respective processes will not be analysed 
specifically. The dynamics of regional economic development in connection with new collec-
tive institutions make the core of this paper. It wants to provide an explanation of why differ-
ent industries clustered within a relatively small region and how they created dynamic inter-
connections and spill-over.  
Chapter II provides a brief overview of the industrial cluster; firstly, woollen cloth as an 
example of a successful transition from artisanry and putting-out to modern factory produc-
tion; secondly, coal mining that experienced an industrial reorganisation based on ideas of 
rationalization and economies of scale; and thirdly, iron and steel. The developments in coal 
and steel are only briefly sketched. They are central to chapter III analysing interconnections 
between industries. They regard knowledge transfer between industries, general supply indus-
tries, development of commercial and organisational know-how, corporate finance, and trans-
portation infrastructure. Chapter IV provides a summarizing discussion. 
2.  Three clusters of the industrial region 
2.1. Woollen cloth 
In the 18
th
 century Aachen had become the dominant region in the German woollen cloth 
trade;27 it pioneered the introduction of spinning and carding machines in woollen cloth in the 
early 19
th
 century. Traditional production was based on lime-free water indispensable for fin-
est cloth qualities, the typical product of the region; warm springs close to Aachen provided 
excellent means for finishing and dying the cloth. Production was organised as a combination 
of artisan production and putting-out. The putting-out system employing domestic spinners 
and weavers had been established at the end of the 17
th
 century in the gild-free towns of Eu-
pen, Montjoie, Burtscheid, and Vaals. In cities of Aachen and Düren, cloth-maker and shearer 
gilds could maintain artisan manufacturing. Yet, artisan workshops also integrated putting-out 
work and employed domestic spinners as well as journeymen and apprentices.28 
In the first two decades of the 19
th
 century the regional production system changed dramat-
ically. About 1830, the large clothiers in Aachen, Burtscheid, Düren, and Eupen operated cen-
tralised factories and owned vertically integrated firms; some of them still connected to spe-
cialised suppliers (spinning, dyeing). Power machines drove all kinds of machinery (scrib-
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bling, carding, roving, spinning, raising, shearing, fulling, pressing etc.). Only weaving was 
mechanized late as fine cloth production required improved looms. Different from English 
cloth districts, where spinning machines were used in the cottage industry,29 in Aachen from 
the beginning comprehensive sets of machinery combining scribbling, carding, and spinning 
machines were introduced, which required factory establishments. Within a few years home 
spinning had been erased and mechanisation had been extended to raising, shearing, and fin-
ishing. Now vertically integrated firms controlled almost the whole process of cloth produc-
tion from scouring the wool to finishing and selling the cloth.30 Yet, vertical integration into 
one firm does not necessarily mean centralised production in a single establishment. Fulling 
mills, for example, requiring much water were usually established on small rivers; dyeing 
mills usually operated outside the towns because of water pollution; both processes were also 
subcontracted. 
Efficient exploitation of machinery required power engines (steam engines, water wheels 
or, some years later, water turbines); access to resources (water and coal), institutions (acces-
sion rights), and an efficient transportation system were increasingly important. Thus, differ-
ent patterns emerged within the larger cloth region. In the towns of Aachen and Düren water 
power was insufficient for the growing industry, accession rights to water were limited and 
different branches and the citizens of the towns competed on the use of water. Especially here, 
steam engines provided a flexible source of power not dependent on location; they also freed 
production from climatic uncertainties and allowed for a continuous utilisation of fixed capi-
tal. Thus from 1815 onwards, cloth industrialists in Aachen, even if they owned water wheels 
and accession rights increasingly operated steam engines. In later decades substitution with 
more powerful and more efficient machines can be observed. In the German context, the 
woollen cloth industry in Aachen pioneered the implementation of steam engines in factory 
production. New technology increased labour productivity and reduced production costs dra-
matically; it is estimated that combined implementation of spinning, scribbling, and carding 
machines and the gig mill increased labour productivity by about 50%. Only power looms 
have not been introduced early; until the end of the 1850s just two industrialists opted for 
larger numbers (85 and 53, the total was 380).31 Yet, slow implementation of new weaving 
technology was economically ‘rational’ as adapting the power loom to fine-cloth weaving was 
a difficult task and if there were any, productivity gains were small. Expenses did not serious-
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ly decrease because of high investment costs and because automatic looms weavers had to 
receive higher wages.32 Thus, incentives for new investments were very week. 
Since the 1820s, the average size of integrated firms increased steadily. Comprehensive 
handwritten reports informed on factory establishments; though they are incomplete they al-
low for some quantitative estimates.33 The city of Aachen and its local surroundings hosted 
more than 120 firms with more than 10 employees (the number of firms with less employees 
is uncounted). For 1846, 1849 and 1852 about 13,000 workers in cloth factories are reported 
and 1,600 in spinning mills. In 1849, 19 large integrated cloth factories in the city of Aachen 
employed more than 8.200 workers.34 Some firms employed a substantial number of domestic 
weavers, but this number is not reported.35 Assuming that the reports overestimate factory 
employees by 30%, those 19 large factories would have employed 5,740 workers within their 
establishments; which gives an average size of 300 workers in such a factory. Vertical inte-
gration, size of the factories, and the average number of workers indicates that by 1850 the 
transition to industrial production was accomplished in Aachen. 
Outside of Aachen different organizational patterns evolved. In the city of Eupen (20km 
from Aachen) specialised spinning and finishing factories have been more common and verti-
cally integrated firms less dominant. 40km from Aachen, in the pre-industrial ID of Montjoie 
the putting-out system with centralised dressing manufactures and high vertical specialization 
survived until the 1860s; with a large rural hinterland there was no incentive to save on labour 
costs and invest into fixed capital.36 The cloth merchants in Montjoie, who in the 18
th
 century 
had been the first establishing manufactures had not become technology adverse; they used 
new technology if it reduced total cost (e.g. spinning) and continued putting-out if transac-
tions costs were lower than centralized production.37 Yet, they lost competitiveness against 
integrated factory production. Diverging local patterns and sustained putting-out can be ex-
plained by local labour markets and by access to the railway: (1.) In Eupen and Montjoie, 
textiles was the only industry supplying wage labour, whereas in Aachen qualified and un-
qualified workers could find alternative occupation (machinery, needles, tobacco, coal, steel, 
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zinc etc.). Thus lower wages for both towns are reported,38 and the incentive to substitute ma-
chinery for labour was smaller. (2.) The railway connecting Aachen to Antwerp, Liege and 
Cologne, increased relative transportation costs for producers from Eupen and Montjoie. This 
aspect will be further developed in the following chapters. 
A reconstruction of how competition exactly worked in the cloth cluster is not possible due 
to lack of sources allowing for such conclusions (e.g. product portfolio, prices and wages). 
Because of its substantial export ratio (see: Appendix A) it must be assumed that the regions 
cloth industry was internationally competitive. Qualitative information gives further evidence: 
Regional institutions were used to get access to technical knowledge; f.e. the chamber of 
commerce and the local government circulated blueprints of new machines; the chamber of 
commerce and the Casino Society, a social club, also provided international newspapers and 
business journals.39 In terms of competition the response to the Prussian Trade Institute 
(Gewerbeinstitut zu Berlin40) offering new machines to cloth producers (new models from 
France, the United States, and Britain) is interesting. Very often those to whom they were 
offered were reluctant to agree to the Trade Institute’s condition of giving open access to their 
operations.41 Keeping production knowledge a secret clearly indicates competition on product 
markets. The observations also suggest not to overestimate state support during early industri-
alisation. Though cloth industrialists did not horizontally cooperate in cloth production, verti-
cal cooperation was usual as specialisation of production indicates. They also cooperatively 
invested into new industries, which will be shown in chapter 3. 
The size of the woollen cloth cluster induced independent supply industries that cannot be 
further discussed here. This regards especially the carding industry, which developed to the 
largest on the German territory.42 Other trades important in the early modern period experi-
enced different industrialization patterns. In needles and paper it started about 20-30 years 
later; and in brass transition to industrial production took not place.43 The reasons cannot be 
discussed here; I rather focus on the two large industries next to woollen cloth, coal mining 
and iron and steel. 
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Becker (1913); Roderburg (1924). 
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2.2. Coal mining 
Since the middle ages, the region’s two mining areas on the rivers Inde and Wurm (see map 2, 
above) produced hard coal, but due to geological and institutional factors they developed 
quite different production systems: (1.) The coal fields on the Wurm touched five states with 
different legal systems; ownership was thus dispersed and mines were small and less produc-
tive; (2.) for geological reasons and because of property rights collective water handling was 
impossible on the Wurm; (3.) the Wurm fields provided anthracite coal, the Inde fields provid-
ed bituminous coal.44 
Since the 30 Years War, the Inde fields were owned by the Duke of Jülich, whose admin-
istration leased out coal extraction.45 When in the second half of the 18
th
 century mining re-
quired deeper pits and sophisticated water handling systems, the extraction rights for most 
mines were leased to one single consortium allowing for coordination and scale economies. 
By and by the Wültgens-Englerth family concentrated most of the licenses. Under the new 
French government, the family was able to contract a long term lease and with the mining law 
of 1810 it became the owner of the two most important mines.46 Region specific institutional 
arrangements thus promoted early capitalist entrepreneurship allowing for consolidation and 
long-term investments. 
The technology driven transition towards ‘industrial’ production came much later in the 
Wurm area, mainly in the 1820s. Then, all mines introduced modern steam engines, which 
increased water handling capacities and allowed for more continuous and safer production. 
Furthermore, different mines connected their water pumping to each other. The effects were 
yet limited before, in the 1830s, ownership concentration allowed for rationalization of pro-
duction. An important factor in this process has been the new institution of joint stock compa-
nies, in which a broad set of regional industries cooperated; the argument is developed in the 
following chapter. 
From the 1830s onwards, the mines of both Wurm and Inde prospered due to increasing in-
dustrial demand for coal and to the Rhenish railway giving access to more distant markets.47 
Production and sales data for the Wurm shows a volatile upward tendency from 1820 to 1835. 
  
                                                          
44
  Willms (1923); Hinzen (1929); Schunder (1968); Wiesemann (1995); for a detailed analysis of pre-industrial 
regional coal mining see: Reckendrees (2014a), pp.12-30. 
45
  Schunder (1968), pp.26-31. 
46
  Stegemann (1910), pp.14-15; Reckendrees (2014a), pp.16-18, 28, 102-111. 
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Figure 1: Inde and Wurm. Coal production (in metric tons, log) 1814-60. 
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Source: Reckendrees (2014a), pp.176 (description of the data, ibid. pp.156-161). 
From then on, with concentrated ownership rationalisation allowing for scale economies and 
productivity increase, and combined with growing demand sales increased. Yet, the central-
ised mines on the Inde (mining company Eschweiler Bergwerksverein, EBV) performed rela-
tively better. The reasons are partly path dependence (favourable institutional arrangements in 
the 18
th
 century resulting in early concentration) but more importantly, with increasing re-
gional industrial production the market for the Inde’s product, bituminous coal, grew much 
faster than the market for anthracite coal from the Wurm. Bituminous coal was chosen for 
steam engines, steel and zinc production and so on. Anthracite coal was used for household 
consumption. When steam engines were adjusted to anthracite coal in the 1850s, production 
growth on the Wurm accelerated due to substantially lower prices. 
2.3. Iron and steel 
The developments in iron and steel are also only briefly described. Literature48 does not pro-
vide reliable comprehensive data and own data collection, based on reconstructions of plant 
level information, is not yet completed. Reliable estimates are difficult to undertake; the gen-
eral tendencies in iron and steel are however quite clear.49 
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  Best overview: Schainberg (1997); Bömmels (1925); Neu (1989). 
49
  Difficulties result from incomplete data (prices), reporting of capacities instead of production; unspecific 
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Historically, pig iron and wrought iron were produced in the hilly Eifel around Schleiden 
(map 3) with plenty water and charcoal supply. Yet with early industrialization the traditional 
area lost its competitive advantage and the region of Aachen attracted a new steel cluster. 
Map 3: Industrial Region of Aachen. Location of Iron and Steel Production, 1850s. 
 
Source: Annuschat (2007), p.6; own adaptation. Square dots indicate blast furnaces and steel works. 
The line indicates the railway from Cologne to Antwerp. 
Since the 1820s, wrought iron production tended to move away from the traditional area to 
Düren, where Eberhard Hoesch introduced the puddling process in his new plant.50 With the 
decision to build a railway from Cologne to Antwerp in 1834 (see below) the relocation of the 
iron industry gained full momentum. Puddling steel works and rolling mills were now set up 
on top of the Inde coal with direct access to the railway. Due to lower transportation costs 
these works increasingly substituted imported Belgium iron for Eifel iron.51 In the 1850s, new 
coke blast furnaces were established near Eschweiler, from then on traditional (charcoal) iron 
production in the Eifel focused exclusively on special qualities and production stagnated. 
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 Beck (1899), p.703. 
51
  Fremdling (1986), p.134; Leboutte (1988); Pasleau (1993); Schainberg (1997). 
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Figure 2:  District of Aachen. Estimate of iron and steel production 1815-60 
(Aachen-Stolberg-Eschweiler; Düren; Eifel). 
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Source: Own data collection, not yet consolidated but the relations between the sub-areas are presented 
correctly. 
Early industrial development of iron and steel was technologically driven. Particularly im-
portant were the introduction of the puddling process (1825) and new rolling mills, both de-
pendent on foreign technical experts.52 From the 1840s onwards, development is better de-
scribed as a demand-pull process. For example Hoesch, owner of steel works and rolling mills 
in Düren, in 1847 set up a new plant in Eschweiler because of ’increasing demand for rails 
and considering that due to the nearby coal mines […] Michiels [a competitor in Eschweiler] 
has an advantage of almost 2,000 Thaler a year’.53 Increasing machinery production in Aa-
chen and Eschweiler had created a new, still small market for wrought iron in the 1830s, and 
encouraged the establishment of new puddling works (Englerth & Cünzer 1832). With the 
construction of the Rhenish railway in the late 1830s (see below), the market expanded rapid-
ly requiring large amounts of standardized iron products (rails, wagon material) and attracting 
new factories.54  
The districts’ producers, first movers in their respective industries, were among the largest 
German railway suppliers and soon exported mass produced goods to other German and Aus-
                                                          
52
  Fremdling (1984); Fremdling (1991). 
53
  Hashagen and Brüggemann (1916), p.559. 
54
  T. Michiels & Cie. 1842; ‘Rothe Erde’ Piedboeuf & Co. 1846; Hoesch plant ‘Eschweiler Station’ 1847. 
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trian regions.55 The establishment of coke blast furnaces in the 1850s was both technologically 
and demand driven. The knowledge of coke iron process had been systemised and codified 
allowing for knowledge transfer from Belgium to Germany;56 equally important were the new 
steel works and rolling mills who demanded increasing amounts of pig iron so that import 
substitution seemed to be a reasonable strategy. 
2.4. Workforce and labour markets 
In the 1810s and 1820s, new textile machinery had set free very many workers and work was 
cheaply available. Miners had side-line agriculture or were smallholders working in mines 
only when harvest was brought in, they were supplemented by temporary migrant labourers 
from adjunct regions. The region’s steel industry was still small. There was thus no labour 
shortage until the 1830s: population increase and migrants from the rural hinterland, if neces-
sary also from Limburg or Belgium supplied additional workforce. Around 1830 some hun-
dred Belgian migrant workers worked in the cloth factories and machinery industry; they had 
industrial experience and they were easily disposable, as they would be sent back home, if 
there was no work.57 Yet, with increasing industrial production since the late 1830s and espe-
cially in the 1850s, the labour market changed dramatically.  
Wage data indicating the change in the labour market is spurious, yet adaptive company 
policies allow the conclusion of emerging labour markets. For example, when the Wurm 
mines in 1839 established a health and accident insurance (Knappschaft)58 like the one the 
neighbouring Inde mines had introduced three decades before, the Inde mines started provid-
ing housing for workers. They were not only competing with the other coal mines (Appendix 
B on wages in coal mining), but also with the new zinc and steel plants established on top of 
the coal and with the Rhenish railway looking for construction workers.59 The woollen cloth 
industry, in which many young women were occupied, was for example challenged by newly 
set-up tobacco manufactories offering less exhausting and relatively well paid work to girls 
and young women.60 The reports of the chambers of commerce for the 1850s inform about 
rising wages and wage competition, yet not about the wage levels.61 
                                                          
55
  Wagenblass (1973); Seeling (1983); HSAD RA1599: The authorized representatives of Collectiv Gesell-
schaft T. Michiels & Cie. to Royal Government Aachen, A.W. Hüffer, St. Beissel, 1.10.1846. 
56
  The argument corresponds to Mokyr (2002). 
57
  Althammer (2002), p.376; Schainberg (1997); Reckendrees (2010), p.75. 
58
  Due to French law, Knappschaften were not yet mandatory; Reckendrees (2015, forthcoming). 
59
  HSAD RA 7960, folio 398pp: “Complaint about scarcity of coal […]”, 20.5.1842. 
60
  HSAD RA1542: Chamber of Commerce to Royal Government, Aachen, 24.4.1857.  
61
  For example, Handelskammer zu Stolberg (1854), p.17. 
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3. Interconnections 
3.1. Machinery production: A bridge between industries 
Textile machinery was the root of Aachen’s machinery industry interconnecting all sectors. 
First machines were imported from Belgium (Cockerill’s workshops in Verviers and Liége), 
but local supply was soon built up. A crucial step in 1816/17 was the decision of Kelleter, a 
cloth merchant, to build a spinning factory using a steam engine; he employed two British 
mechanics, ‘very dextrous artists’62, to construct the factory. One of the ‘artists’, Samuel 
Dobbs, came from Cockerill, settled in Eschweiler and founded the machine factory Englerth, 
Reuleaux & Dobbs (1819) in cooperation with a family member and an engineer of the Eng-
lerth coal mines (Inde). He was not the first to produce steam engines, but his cooperation 
with the mine owning family made him the first to have commercial success.63 The first en-
gines were produced for the family mines, but soon other mines, cloth factories, and other 
customers wanted to buy the engines that could compete with Cockerill’s and others’ ma-
chines.64 Dobbs later set-up a wire factory in Eschweiler (1822), constructed the already men-
tioned puddling works of Hoesch in Düren,65 and was engaged in several new firms in Aachen 
(Dobbs & Nellessen 1833-36; Poensgen & Dobbs 1837-40). Everything ‘that comes from the 
hands of this man is beautiful’, wrote the District President to the Ministry in Berlin.66  
In the following two decades the number of machinery, steam engine, and boiler factories 
increased. Woollen cloth firms founded machinery workshops (e.g. G. Startz), specialized 
textile machinery producers emerged and Belgian firms set up factories (Regnier Poncelet & 
Desoer, J. Piedbeuf). The machinery sector served as a specialised supplier for the woollen 
cloth and the steel industry and for coal mining. In the terms of the regional industrialization 
approach backward linkages provide an explanation of the development, from the firm per-
spective also diversification played a role. These new factories at the same time created a new 
market (forward linkages) for the steel industry, as steam engines, boilers, and railway mate-
rial required more and more rolling mill and casted products. In 1832, ten machinery factories 
employed approximately 280 workers, seven years later there were twelve with 600 workers. 
Most of them had a modest size of 10-30 workers, the four larger firms employed between 70 
and 250 workers. With the Rhenish railway starting its operations in 1841 and the increasing 
                                                          
62
  Prussian State Archives, Berlin (GStA-PK) I.HA120D XIII2 no.9: Chief-President Reimann, Aachen, to the 
Royal State Minister and Minister of Trade and Commerce, 19.12.1822. 
63
  The first producer, Wilhelm Dinnendahl, leased his engines due to high prices, Behrens (1974), p.374. 
64
  See price list 1826, Appendix B. 
65
  Beck (1899), p.703. 
66
  GStA-PK I.HA120D XIII2 no.9: Chief-President Reimann, Aachen, to the Royal State Minister and Minister 
of Trade and Commerce, 19.12.1822. 
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number of large factories for steel and zinc (see below) the structure of the machinery indus-
try changed. Now the factories were no longer appendixes to other industries. The largest be-
longed to the most advanced of their kind in Prussia. About 1860, almost 1.000 people 
worked in machinery.67 
3.2. Joint-stock-companies: Cross industrial cooperation 
The large number of companies within the clusters of woollen cloth, iron and steel, and coal 
mining (in the needle industry in Aachen and in the paper industry in Düren) created a com-
petitive environment, as the firms in the respective industry aimed at similar product markets. 
Product specification and price competition seem to have been the most important strategies, 
though resilient data is not available. Spatial concentration allowed them to closely observe 
practices and technology used (especially when the Trade Institute had provided the ma-
chines). Yet, beyond supply relationships industrialists within one sector did not “cooperate” 
they rather aimed at controlling production specific knowledge. Firms (though not all of 
them) did however cooperate in cross-industry activities. For this purpose they set-up new 
joint-stock-companies (JSC), which was a little bit easier under French commercial law than 
under Prussian law, though a royal charter was necessary, too. 
Indirectly the importance of these JSCs can be concluded from Prussian statistics: Though 
the region of Aachen hosted only 2.5% of the Prussian population, more than 15% of all Prus-
sian industrial JSCs founded before 1870 were operating in this region. In fact, the total num-
ber was small yet the Rhine Province pioneered JSC in Prussia. The important features of the 
new institution were shared ownership, legal personality of the firm, and limited liability.68 
There have been only few projects but they were crucial for economic dynamics as they creat-
ed connections between the clusters of woollen cloth, needles, coal mining, iron and steel, and 
zinc. The JSC facilitated diversification of capital accumulated in traditional industries (wool-
len cloth and needles) and knowledge sharing between industries. Regional industrialists, 
merchants, bankers, rentier-capitalists, and enlightened Government officials jointly invested 
in regional projects. I briefly describe some exemplary JSC projects. 
(1.) The ‘Wire Company, Inc.’ 1822 (Drath Fabrick-Compagnie, anonyme Gesellschaft auf 
Aktien), was one of 13 industrial JSC founded in Prussia in the 1820s and 30s.69 The cluster 
created its own supply industry producing ‘fine English steel’ and ‘drawing English iron and 
steel wire’ and aiming at import substitution of expensive raw material supply for the regional 
                                                          
67
  HSAD BR2116 (no. 45-53): Table on commerce and trade and factories; Supplement to the table on com-
merce and trade 1837, 1840, 1843, 1846, 1849, 1852, 1855, 1858; Reckendrees (2010), p.63. 
68
  On Prussian JSC between 1800 and 1870, see Reckendrees (2012); a list of JSCs, ibid., p.157, tab. 9. 
69
  Reckendrees (2010), pp.63-66; Gilson (2005). 
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needle producers.70 Locally produced wire was expected to be cheap and should improve the 
needle companies’ international competitiveness. The expectation was not immediately ful-
filled, but the establishment demonstrates how the institution of the JSC enabled cooperation: 
The initiators were a heterogeneous group of needle producers (supply motives), owners of 
coal mines (sales motives), and cloth producers (diversification motives); the new venture 
also included officials of the District’s government in order to politically safeguard the pro-
ject. The factory and its machines were constructed by aforementioned engineer Dobbs, indi-
cating that available technical expertise was used across different sectors, and that few experts 
have been crucial for industrial development. The company was the first to be managed by a 
salaried manager, Friedrich Thyssen, who also played a role in other JSC.71 
(2.) The United Coal Mines on the Wurm 1836 (Vereinigungs-Gesellschaft für Steinkoh-
lenbau im Wurm Revier). In the 1820s, several attempts to concentrate the small mines on the 
Wurm failed. The aim was combining water handling systems, reducing the number of pits, 
and connecting the tunnels; but the owners wanted to keep control and property and could not 
agree on collective property. In the mid-1830s, an investors’ group similar to the one that set-
up the Wire Company joined for a JSC that should buy the Wurm mines. After having con-
vinced James Cockerill (owner of a large coal mine) and the private bank Sal. Oppenheim jr. 
& Cie. in Cologne to become project partners, the founding succeeded.72 With an initial share 
capital of 250.000 Prussian Thaler UCM was one of the largest industrial corporations at that 
time.73 The founders were described as ‘respectable industrialist, public servants, and re-
spectable capitalists’.74 Most of them wanted cheap coal supply for their factories; yet they 
also aimed at monopolizing the house coal trade by uniting ‘all anthracite mines of the Wurm 
and [eliminating] the harmful competition in order to achieve higher prices and to reduce the 
production costs by more rational production methods’.75 The prospects of coal mining prom-
ised high return, but profitability required technical combination and rationalization. The JSC 
bought and merged several coal mines and connected production sites above and below 
ground-level. It should also invest in new coal fields and in railways in order to create new 
                                                          
70
  GStA-PK I.HA74K, IX Niederrhein no. 6: Concession application, 19.3.1822; Founding contract, 9.1.1822. 
On the results of the first decades: Gilson (2005). 
71
  GStA-PK I.HA120D, XIII2 no.9: Chief President Reimann to the Royal State Minister and Minister for 
Trade and Commerce, Count von Bülow in Berlin, Aachen, 19.12.1822. 
72
  On Oppenheim and the Aachen district: Teichmann (1995). 
73
  Reckendrees (2014a), pp. 49-76. 
74
  GStA-PK I.HA120A XII7 no.113: Royal Concession for the United Coal Mines, Royal Government Aachen, 
11.7.1836. List of shareholders in Reckendrees (2010), p.68. 
75
  Hilt (1886), p.3. 
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markets.76 A competing corporation, Pannesheider Mining Association (1842), had a similar 
ownership structure and approach, but it was not successful and taken over by UCM in 1858.77 
UCM had modest success for the first 25 years giving its shareholders 5-10% dividends.78 
The project was ambitious with regard to technical and commercial problems, because con-
centration of operations and water handling required huge investments. Yet, it offered an op-
portunity to invest regionally accumulated capital in a new venture within the region. It in-
duced long term cooperation of entrepreneurs from different branches and intensified and 
interconnected regional activities. Industrialists did not only invest money, they engaged in 
managing the company and by doing this in knowledge sharing. The executive board (admin-
istration) consisted of a lawyer with excellent political contacts, the prosecutor of Aachen, a 
mining engineer (technical expert), and two cloth industrialists who brought in commercial 
expertise (responsibility for accounting, financial administration, sales, and workforce man-
agement).79 This engagement contributed to knowledge diffusion (and creation) within the 
regional industry, because they helped educating administrative employees. 
(3.) The Société Métallurgique de Stolberg (1836). This JSC should operate rolling mills 
for zinc and brass plates, threefold raw zinc capacities, operate coal mines, and (if iron ore 
was found) also blast furnaces, steel works, and rolling mills for e.g. boiler sheets and rails.
80
 
A similar regional group of capitalists from different industries joined with Belgian capitalists 
for setting up a new industry in the region, among others James and John Cockerill, the pri-
vate bank Sal. Oppenheim, and Friedrich Thyssen, director of the Wire Company.
81
 
Concerning ownership, governance, and the regional context, the project had similarities 
with other regional projects (see below on iron and steel); yet, it was also a far more risky 
investment. When it became too risky, regional shareholders decided to partly sell-off to more 
speculative investors. In this regard, the project indirectly confirms the regional pattern of 
industrial projects.82 The expensive and risky undertaking of ore extraction and raw zinc pro-
duction was leased to a Belgian-French group; the Société Métallurgique contracted raw zinc 
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  HSAD RA7951: Statutes of United coal mines, 1836. 
77
  Reckendrees (2014a), pp.77-92. 
78
  Hilt (1886), p.6. 
79 
 Reckendrees (2010), p.68, tab.2. 
80
  HSAD RA7957: Cockerill, Pierlot, Preston & Lambion to Royal Government Aachen, 31.8.1837; GStA-PK 
I.HA120A XII7 no.58: Statutes of Société Métallurgique. 
81
  HSAD RA7957: Mining Authority Bonn to Royal Government Aachen, 7.9.1836; Klass (1957), p.39. In 
Seraing, John Cockerill (1790-1840) had built the largest blast furnaces, steel and rolling mills in Europe: 
Hodges (1960); Fremdling (1981); Pasleau (1993). – The plan to invest in iron and steel was given up after 
the death of the two Cockerills in 1837 and 1840; HSAD RA7957: Mining Authority Bonn to Royal Gov-
ernment Aachen, 11.12.1841; HSAD BAD57: Annual Report on the Inde mining region 1841. 
82
  Regional industrialists also strategically expanded their business to other parts of Europe and invested in 
commercial papers; yet the question here is how joint projects contributed to regional development. 
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supply from this group and focused on rolling mills. However, demand for zinc products in 
Paris and Brussels was increasing and observers started talking about ‘a general rage to go 
into the zinc business now’.83 The rolling mills of Société Métallurgique could no longer com-
pete with its (self-created) vertically integrated competitor and sold the company sold its roll-
ing mills to the Belgian-French group that now founded SA des Mines et Fonderies de Zinc de 
Stolberg (1.6mio. Thaler) bringing in all assets and all its debt (0.56mio. Thaler) making it 
possibly the largest German IPO speculation of the 1840s. More than 50% of the shares were 
owned by French and German banks.84 
(4) In the steel industry, family firms and partnerships had been sufficient for the indus-
try’s rapid growth in the late 1830s and 1840s. Yet, when with the new technology of coke 
blast furnaces the necessary investment for the minimum efficient plant size dramatically in-
creased, and the JSC became the dominant type of firm. Three of the four regional iron and 
steel JSCs followed ‘regional pattern’ of collaboration of capitalists from different industries, 
regional elites and a regional bank already presented: Eschweiler Mining and Iron Production 
Corp. 1848 (Eschweiler Gesellschaft für Bergbau und Eisenerzeugung), Concordia, Eschwei-
ler Mining and Ironworks Corp. 1853 (Concordia, Eschweiler Verein für Bergbau und Hüt-
tenbetrieb), and Aachen Ironworks Corp. 1854 (Aachener Hütten-Actien-Verein). Only the 
vertically integrated Phoenix Mining and Ironworks Corp. 1852 (Phoenix, anonyme Gesell-
schaft für Bergbau und Hüttenbetrieb) followed a different pattern. Its origin was the partner-
ship of T. Michiels & Cie. a rolling mill founded 1841 in Eschweiler by two Belgians and 
cloth industrialists from Eupen. They met heavy resistance from Prussian authorities and 
needed six years to get the concession. It seems as if lack of ‘social capital’ has been decisive 
for extraordinary difficulties, because none of the three other projects had to face similar 
problems. Phoenix, however, was a project of outsiders not belonging to the Aachen network 
without support from the local business elite (Chamber of Commerce) and even the District 
Government, usually supportive to new JSCs, was reluctant.85 
It seems as if regional origin as well as cultural and social ‘closeness’ mattered for cooper-
ation, which was much easier to achieve within the core of the regional industrial network. 
The other three projects had no difficulties founding a JSC. Here, capitalists belonging to the 
regional elites joined forces. Concordia’s founders came from the ‘cycle of most wealthy min-
ing and steel industrialists of the district and the best families of Aachen and Cologne’: The 
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  HSAD BAD59: Annual Report on the Inde mining region 1843. 
84
  HSAD RA7957: Royal Government Aachen, 18.11.1845; Société Métallurgique to Royal Government Aa-
chen, 27.11.1845; Klass (1957), pp.49-51. 
85
  Details in Reckendrees (2012). 
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mining company EBV, owners of blast furnaces, the bank A. Schaaffhausen from Cologne, 
merchants and industrialists. In this case not even the basic requirements for a concession 
were fulfilled (because the industry was not new and the investments not particularly high) 
but due to the crisis years (1847-50) the Districts Government found it ‘very pleasing if min-
ing and iron and steel on the Inde would get new dynamics and would be able to successfully 
compete with the industry on the Ruhr.’86 The directors of the company argued more in a na-
tionalist perspective and explained that the rational was import substitution of pig iron from 
Belgium; uncertain foreign supply to the puddling and rolling mills should be substituted with 
local production.87 
3.3. Infrastructure and the Rhenish railway 
Infrastructure is not the most discussed factor of industrial clusters and ID, perhaps because 
the IDs of the 1970s already had access to transportation and communication infrastructure; 
yet it is implicitly, and sometimes explicitly part of the argument, particularly in cluster theo-
ry where transportations systems are seen as crucial complementarities to the clustered indus-
try.88 During early industrialization improvement of infrastructure, especially for the transport 
of heavy goods, was a prerequisite of industrial development. So was it in Aachen, where 
regional companies and entrepreneurs, and also the state, continuously engaged in improving 
transportation systems (beneficial to all cluster participants). In the 1820, this mainly con-
cerned paved roads, in the 1830s regional industrialists bargained for a railway. It should con-
nect Aachen and Cologne and Aachen (via Liége) and Antwerp, and thus the regional industry 
to shipping routes and to supply industries in Belgium. The network of paved roads increased 
from 159km (1816) to 250km (1831) and 375km (1846), many of them private financed turn-
pikes. Especially the new roads from Eschweiler to Düren and to Weiden, from Düren to Co-
logne and from Aachen to Eupen connected the commercial centres more closely and contrib-
uted to increase in inner-regional trade.89 
Of major importance was the Rhenish Railway, originally projected in 1833 as a railway 
from Cologne to Antwerp bypassing Aachen some kilometres north. The Aachen chamber of 
commerce, however, under its chairman David Hansemann, and the city administration en-
gaged in persistent negotiations with the Prussian Government, they made feasibility studies 
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  Quotes from: GStA-PK I.HA120A XII7 no.69: Opinion of the Royal Government Aachen, 21.3.1853. HSAD 
RA7990: First general assembly and list of shareholders, 28.5.1853. 
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  HSAD RA7990: Appeal for the concession of a joint stock company for the construction and operation of 
blast furnaces in Eschweiler, 28.2.1853. 
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  Becattini (1989), p.132; Porter (2000), pp.257, 260; Zaratiegui (2004), p.82. 
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  Reimann (1834), pp.48-50; Wirminghaus (1917). 
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for a new route including Aachen, Eschweiler and Düren and finally attracted the railway to 
the city of Aachen and the industrial locations. It connected Aachen and the industrial region 
with Cologne and the Rhine ports, with the steel industry of Liége, and the harbour of Ant-
werp. A detailed account of the negotiations together with contemporary documentation90 
allows the conclusion that it was industry and the expected additional transports of goods and 
people that made the relocation of the planned railway possible. Lobbying did not negatively 
impact other interest groups, the new plan made the railway a few kilometres longer, and tun-
nel and a bridge were necessary, yet from the late 1840s onwards the increased costs were 
more than fully covered by additional transportation of goods and people. The railway opened 
in 1841 had an ambiguous impact on different industries. It connected Aachen, Düren, the 
Inde mines and the new steel producers to Cologne, Liége, and Antwerp both reducing trans-
portation costs and enlarging the markets, but it had a negative impact on the Wurm mines 
being relatively far away from the railway.91 However, more important for economic dynam-
ics was that the railway created high expectations and in the early 1840s, new iron and steel 
factories were set-up on the Inde coal close to the railway. 
Regional development confirms the forward and backward linkages of the railways, which 
Fremdling has analysed in detail.92 In the region of Aachen, the railway created a massive 
increase in demand for steel and for machinery, which again created new demand for coal of 
industries that benefitted from the railway, like iron and steel, zinc, and machinery. Improved 
infrastructure had a strong effect on spatial concentration of industry around cities with rail-
way access (Aachen, Stolberg, and Eschweiler). Even location of woollen cloth factories was 
affected by new means of transportation. Aachen, Eupen, and Montjoie had been centres of 
early modern cloth production. Already in the beginning of the 19
th
 century, larger distances 
to coal and easier access to water had created a diverging production patterns in Montjoie and 
Eupen with less vertical integration than in Aachen (see above). When Aachen got direct ac-
cess to the railway, the relative costs of coal supply for producers in Montjoie and Eupen and 
worsened their competitive position. 
3.4. Legal and social institutions 
Institutional arrangements have been supportive to economic development. Some of it can be 
attributed to French commercial law and institutions, which continued to regulate regional 
actors and transactions, despite the region became a part of Prussia. Substitution of French 
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  Kumpmann (1910), p.109-169 (with information on contemporary reports). 
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  HSAD BAD60: Annual report on the Wurm mines, 1844. 
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  Fremdling (1975).  
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law for Prussian laws was a slow process and new laws were inspired by the French example 
(Railway Act 1838, Joint-Stock-Company Act 1843, General German Trade Law 1861). 
Some of the implications have already been discussed. 
Other institutions of French origin have possibly been even more important for the region. 
They have been creatively adapted, especially the Chamber of Commerce (1804),93 the Com-
mercial Court (1805) and the Trade Court (1808). In Prussia, Chambers of Commerce had 
administrative functions (providing information on industry and trade to the Prussian minis-
tries and ministerial information to the local industry), but they were formed by elected indus-
try representatives. In practice, the chamber of Aachen acclaimed a double function: it ful-
filled administrative tasks and it represented industrial interests towards the Government. 
Though representation of economic interests was not the “idea” of the chambers, the regional 
industry used the institution for this purpose, which can be shown for example in regard to the 
projected Rhenish railway or to tariffs. With the chamber lobbying, it seems as if industrialists 
from Aachen had a stronger voice than industrialists from neighbouring regions, who had no 
institutional form to articulate collective interests.  
Also the judges of the Commercial Court
94
 and the Trade Court
95
 were elected representa-
tives from commerce, trade and industry. The Commercial Court smoothed or decided on 
conflicts between firms and between merchants; the Trade Court decided on labour related 
conflicts. Both institutions were beneficial to economic development; while the civil law was 
changing only slowly, they allowed for more flexible case based decisions
96
 adapting com-
mercial law to the needs of the changing economy. The courts also created a framework for 
the articulation of diverging industrial interests that were not always mitigated but at least 
negotiated; this processes supported trust and thus a more stable institutional environment.
97
 
Another example of new institutions is the Aachen Fire Insurance Corp. (1825, Aachener 
Feuer-Versicherungs-Gesellschaft). 90% of initial shareholders came from the region, many 
of which were factory owners as the company insured industrial property against fire.98 It did 
not directly contribute to industrial development, but it helped pacifying the working class 
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  Chambre consultatives de manufacture, fabriques, arts et métiers, Zeyss (1907); Thomes (2004), pp.20-33; 
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124; Berndt (1884). 
 24 
and moderating the existential problems of unemployment and illness. The main instrument 
was a savings bank for the working class established in reaction to a violent revolt in 1830. 
Business elites obviously perceived limited social inclusion and stability as an important con-
dition for the reproduction of the socio-economic system.99 
In order to get license an insurance JSC was to spend 50% of its net-income on social pur-
poses (after reserves had been accumulated). In the case of the Fire Insurance this was mainly 
the savings bank (Association for the Advancement of Industriousness, 1834). It served as an 
instrument to ideologically integrate workers into the capitalist system that in the view of far-
sighted industrialists depended on social systems safeguarding the workers from the risk of 
wage labour: Savings should allow survival in times of unemployment or illness, as most 
workers did not have any other means like side-agriculture. The insurance subsidized savings 
accounts with attractive interest rates. Yet, these premiums depended on well behaviour: Bank 
officials decided on the premium based on the savers ‘industriousness, order, and well con-
duct’. Workers, who continuously saved for three years and accumulated 20 Thaler (the wage 
of 50 days), could receive a premium of three Thaler. The bank was extremely successful; in 
the 1840s and 50s, it advanced to the largest Prussian savings bank.100 
4. Summary 
Each of the three briefly described clusters followed its own historical path and sector specific 
dynamics in terms of new technology used and competition. It has been shown that additional 
to what the cluster- (and also the ID-) concept would focus at technological linkages and 
knowledge spill-over between unrelated industries were important features of regional eco-
nomic development. The three industrial clusters “overlapped” and they have been connected 
(1.) by machinery production (at that time almost a general purpose supply industry), (2.) by 
the institution of the JSC allowing for capital diversification as well as commercial and tech-
nical knowledge transfer between unrelated industries and towards new industries, (3.) by 
favourable institutions that helped shaping an “industrial atmosphere” (A. Marshall) and 
cross-industrial cooperation; furthermore, complementarities like the transportation infrastruc-
ture reinforced spatial concentration and increased cluster advantages. 
The existence of pre-industrial spatial concentrations of firms as well as location of natural 
resources (coal) allowed for a regional machinery industry and encouraged improvements of 
transportation infrastructure, which then attracted new industries into the region. In woollen 
                                                          
99
  On the revolt and on further attempts of social inclusion Reckendrees (2014b). 
100
  HSAD RA16058: Direction of the Aachen Fire Insurance Comp, 25.10.1833; Anonymous (1861), p.94; 
Thomes (1999). 
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cloth, the transition to industrial production started with the French Revolution. In the former-
ly guilded cities of Aachen (also in Burtscheid and Düren) availability of labour saving ma-
chinery and high labour costs compared to the countryside induced vertically integrated pro-
duction in firms allocating increasing amounts of fixed capital. Vertical specialisation (a char-
acteristic of an ID) did not fully disappear, but it became less important. Firms did however 
use the regional labour pool to temporarily outsource and expand production. They competed 
on product markets and for labour, but some of them also joined for new industrial projects. 
At the same time, the pre-industrial ID of Montjoie where putting-out and vertical specializa-
tion continued to exist declined. 
New textile machines was the root cause for the regional machinery industry; first, ma-
chinery was imported from Belgium but soon local supply was built up due to the demands of 
the textile industry, but also due to the mines with their huge demand for energy. The machin-
ery industry, soon employing hundreds of workers and stretching beyond the regional market, 
supplied industrial equipment to all industries. It also created a market for steel products (to a 
lesser extent for coal). Its experts were employed in all industries improving production and 
setting up new factories. The inter-connections created by the machinery industry is also re-
flected by the fact that respective firms were established as partnerships of engineers on the 
one hand, and owners of coal mines, textile factories, or rolling mills, on the other hand. 
After 1830, a steel cluster emerged with iron and steel production and finished goods. Its 
location depended on resources and infrastructure reducing access costs to markets. The rea-
sons to concentrate close to Eschweiler were availability of coal and coke, streets and rail-
ways, and the regional market for steel products (like machinery industry, steam engines and 
boilers, railways, wagon industry). Coal mining where resources determine followed a well 
know growth pattern of scale economics; yet it served also as a market for machinery and as 
an opportunity for investments. 
Firms within an industry predominantly competed; yet firms of different industries joined 
to engage in new industries and in large scale projects, this is interpreted as a cooperative pat-
tern of (parts of) the social elites of the industrial region; “locality” and social closeness mat-
tered just like in a (neo-) Marshallian ID. “Locality” was further deepened by collective insti-
tutions (chamber of commerce, commercial court, trade court) enforcing communication and 
compromising among industrialists. Though it is not possible to establish causality between 
those social institutions and cross-industrial new ventures, it seems to be plausible to assume 
social and communicative structures having a positive impact on observed cooperation. These 
common projects mainly took the form of a JSC. This new institution allowed for limited lia-
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bility, shared ownership and diversification of capital, it enabled inter-sector cooperation, 
attracted capital to new ventures and industries, and perhaps even more crucial, it helped dif-
fusing the scarce resources of entrepreneurial, organizational, and commercial expertise as 
well as technical knowledge. The social composition of the respective firms represents core 
businesses and successful entrepreneurs with different cluster backgrounds. Of course, each of 
the industrial projects can be explained by self-interest and profit expectations. The argument 
presented here is that the institutional environment developed within the region encouraged 
cooperative approaches to reach the respective economic aims. 
In regard to the concepts of IDs and clusters it was the aim of this article to ‘show’ that 
they are fully applicable to early regional industrialization in the first half of the 19
th
 century, 
the intention was rather to creatively use some of the basic ideas in order to analyse a small 
pioneering region within the relatively backward state of Prussia. Combining the industry 
approach and the regional perspective has helped identifying important factors of dynamic 
economic change that else might have been overlooked.  
The region lost its pioneering role in the 1860s. With the German railway network com-
pleted increasing the relative price of market access, with the coal resources on the Ruhr at-
tracting modern iron and steel works, and due to limited size of the region it became less at-
tractive to new invest within the region. The region did not decline but it grew slower than 
other industrialising German regions. Regional entrepreneurs who increasingly invested in 
other parts of Germany and in Europe (especially at the Ruhr and in Austria and Poland) con-
tributed to this development. For them, “locality” became less important than expected earn-
ings. 
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Appendix A: Sales of the cloth industry of Aachen and Burtscheid 1837-1848 
pieces 
produced
Prussian 
tariff 
union
South of 
Germany
North of  
Germany
Nether-
lands
Belgiu
m
Switzer-
land
Italy, 
Napoli, 
Sicilia
Spain Levante China
North 
America
Aachen
1838 67.650 10,6% 10,3% 8,9% 13,3% 3,0% 6,7% 31,0% 4,4% 4,4% 7,4%
1840 62.100 12,9% 6,4% 4,8% 12,1% 1,6% 8,1% 28,3% 5,6% 6,4% 6,8% 7,2%
1844 65.280 12,9% 13,0% 8,7% 8,0% 10,4% 29,9% 1,5% 2,6% 7,7%
1847 70.100 9,6% 8,8% 7,7% 7,4% 8,0% 27,4% 2,1% 25,4%
Burtscheid
1838 16.500 18,2% 15,2% 18,2% 12,1% 3,0% 6,1% 24,2% 3,0%
1840 16.500 24,2% 15,2% 18,2% 12,1% 9,1% 16,4% 4,8%
1844 17.100 24,6% 18,7% 19,9% 8,8% 11,7% 16,4%
1847 18.720 13,9% 16,0% 16,0% 13,4% 11,8% 9,6% 19,3%
totals
1838 84.150 12,1% 11,3% 10,7% 13,1% 3,0% 6,5% 29,7% 3,6% 4,2% 5,9%
1840 78.600 15,3% 8,3% 7,6% 12,1% 1,3% 8,3% 25,8% 4,5% 6,1% 5,3% 5,7%
1844 82.380 15,3% 14,2% 11,0% 8,1% 10,7% 27,1% 1,2% 2,1% 6,1%
1847 88.820 10,5% 10,4% 9,5% 8,7% 8,8% 23,6% 1,7% 24,1%  
Source: Wichterich (1922), p.191 (citing Archiv der Handelskammer Acta IV/18, destroyed) 
Appendix B: Wages in coal mining, in “Silbergroschen” per shift, 1837-60 
Inde and Wurm
average coal hewer carrier
1837 15
1838
1839 16,3
1840 16
1841 15,4
1842 15,1
1843 14,9
1844 14,6
1845 14,6
1846 16
1847 16,3
1848 14,6
1849 13,7
1850 15,4 16,58 14,17
1851 15,2 16,92 14,17
1852 15,3 16,75 14,25
1853 14,9 17,58 15,17
1854 19,8 19,17 16,17
1855 20,1 19,08 16,33
1856 19,8 21,33 17,00
1857 20,1 21,25 18,75
1858 20,1 21,33 17,92
1859 20,92 16,92
1860 20,00 16,00
Eschweiler Coal Mining Comp.
 
Sources: Arlt (1921), p.146, Huyssen (1861), pp.19-20. 
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Appendix C: The Prices of Steam Engines. Rhine Province, 1826 
producer machine HP
use of coal, in 
tons per 12h coal / hp
price in 
Thaler
Englerth, Reuleaux u. Dobbs no. 29 12,0 4,000 0,333 3.400 double impact
Englerth, Reuleaux u. Dobbs no. 41 8,5 3,000 0,352 4.000 double impact
Englerth, Reuleaux u. Dobbs no. 47 8,5 2,000 0,234 4.000 double impact
Englerth, Reuleaux u. Dobbs no. 48 8,5 2,000 0,234 4.000 double impact
Englerth, Reuleaux u. Dobbs list price, 1826 10,0 3,750 0,375 4.200 **
Freund, Berlin no. 08 8,0 0,956 0,120 4.448 double impact
Joh. Dinnendahl no. 27 10,8 4,500 0,417 4.600 double impact
Cockerill list price, 1822* 10,0 4.730 low pressure
Cockerill no. 44 10,8 4,500 0,417 5.690 double impact
W. Dinnendahl no. 38 18,9 9,000 0,477 6.000 single impact
Cockerill list price, 1822* 10,0 6.170 high pressure
Englerth, Reuleaux u. Dobbs list price, 1826 20,0 6,250 0,313 6.670 **
Cockerill no. 36 16,0 3,000 0,188 7.300 double impact
Englerth, Reuleaux u. Dobbs no. 34 13,5 3,333 0,247 7.300 double impact
Cockerill list price, 1825* 20,0 7.974 low pressure
Cockerill no. 39 10,8 4,500 0,417 8.000 double impact
Joh. Dinnendahl no. 21 19,8 7,250 0,366 8.000 single impact
W. Dinnendahl no. 46 16,1 4,500 0,279 8.000 double impact
Cockerill list price, 1825* 20,0 8.190 high pressure
Englerth, Reuleaux u. Dobbs list price, 1826 30,0 8.460 **
Englerth, Reuleaux u. Dobbs no. 40 17,6 6,750 0,383 9.000 double impact
Englerth, Reuleaux u. Dobbs no. 50 21,6 5,000 0,231 9.000 single impact
Cockerill list price, 1825* 30,0 9.995 high pressure
Joh. Dinnendahl no. 20 27,9 7,500 0,269 10.000 single impact
W. Dinnendahl no. 42 16,9 3,750 0,222 10.000 double impact
Englerth, Reuleaux u. Dobbs no. 43 26,7 13,250 0,497 10.500 single impact
Englerth, Reuleaux u. Dobbs list price, 1826 40,0 10.510 **
Cockerill list price, 1825* 30,0 11.011 low pressure
Cockerill no. 25 38,5 6,500 0,169 11.500 double impact
Franz Dinnendahl no. 22 30,0 11.500 double impact
Englerth, Reuleaux u. Dobbs no. 45 28,0 9,000 0,321 11.900 double impact
Englerth, Reuleaux u. Dobbs no. 33 30,0 5,333 0,178 11.925 double impact
Joh. Dinnendahl no. 26 32,2 8,750 0,271 12.000 single impact
Cockerill no. 37 35,0 3,000 0,086 15.000 double impact
* in franc: 3,89 franc = 1 Thaler ** fob Cologne  
Sources: Severin (1826), pp.320-326; Van Neck (1979), p.410 (on Cockerill). 
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